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THE PHILOSOPHER'S BRIEF 
Paul Horwitz* 
I 
One of Kent Greenawalt's signal virtues is his eminent rea-
sonableness and his ability to listen. In the classroom and in print, 
he offers a fair hearing to the contending viewpoints on law and 
religion, and offers thoughtful views of his own. In person and on 
the printed page, he is the seminar leader par excellence. 
This is at once a great strength and a surprising flaw of 
Greenawalt's extraordinary new contribution to law and religion 
scholarship, the two-volume work Religion and the Constitution. 1 
Greenawalt's voice in these books is the voice of reason, and it is 
an attractive one. At the same time, it leaves its readers some-
what short of a definitive standard by which to judge its success. 
Like many a full seminar class, we may emerge from a study of 
his work a good deal wiser, but still uncertain about what we 
have learned about religion and the Constitution. 
The passage that best illustrates this comes at the beginning 
of both volumes of Religion and the Constitution. He writes: 
[M]y approach to the subject is grounded on the following 
three premises: (1) Neither free exercise nor nonestablishment 
is reducible to any single value; many values count. (2) Sound 
constitutional approaches to the religion clauses cannot be 
reduced to a single formula or set of formulas, although we 
can identify major considerations that should guide legislators 
and judges. (3) The most profitable way to develop sensible 
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approaches is from the "bottom up"-addressing discrete is-
sues in their rich complexity and investigating conflicting val-
ues over a range of issues. (p. 1). 
Elsewhere. Greenawalt adds that given the difficulty of rec-
onciling the multiple values underlying the religion clauses, one 
must approach such questions with a suitable "modest[y] about 
the opportunities for our practical reason to produce demonstra-
bly correct conclusions for troublesome issues."2 On this view, "no 
simple formulas are available to resolve difficult questions" about 
the religion clauses. However, "a similar range of considerations 
or factors figures for many problems," so that he can offer at least 
some guidance in a broad array of "standard" cases.' 
Greenawalt might say that a sufficiently careful "bottom-
up" approach can impose some order on the religion clauses. 
But. in his insistence that no value or formula can sum up there-
ligion clauses. I see an acknowledgement of the irresistible, un-
avoidable messiness of the religion clauses. 
Greenawalt is right. There is and can be no "Unified Field 
Theory of the Religion Clauses." No single value or approach to 
law and religion can satisfy everyone- particularly if, as 
Greenawalt does. one seeks to reconcile that value not only with 
the religion clauses in the abstract, but also with the Court's own 
tangled precedents, and with such post-founding developments 
as the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
What, then. are we left with? Greenawalt suggests that we 
should address the religion clauses "not in the abstract[,] but by 
focusing on concrete issues in context" (p. 543). We are left, in 
other words. with the careful case-by-case inquiry that fills out 
these two masterful volumes. 
I wonder, however, how we should ultimately judge the per-
suasiveness of this approach in each of the specific areas that 
Greenawalt examines. Is it a "common lawyerly" approach that 
attempts to crunch cases one by one?• If so, it is a superb exam-
ple of the craft: but it is more than that. Greenawalt believes that 
some cases are more or less right or wrong; the Constitution 
·'subsists independent of precedent."' Although Greenawalt's 
2. GREE~A WALT. FREE EXERCISE AND FAIR!'ESS, supra note 1. at 6. 
-'· /d. at 7. 
4. See Steven D. Smith. Disco11rse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom, 
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming) (reviewing GREENAWALT, ESTABLISHMENT AND 
FAIR~ESS (2006)). 
5. /d. 
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books will be of great value to lawyers, this is thus not simply a 
lawyer's map of the field. 
Instead, I think that Religion and the Constitution is best 
understood as a work grounded in theory: one in which ''consti-
tutional meaning is obtained by interpreting the materials in ac-
cordance with the best available political-moral theory."" It is a 
"philosopher's brief" for the religion clauses, albeit it is distinctly 
a legal philosopher's brief. It proceeds in a philosophical man-
ner: laying out in exquisite detail the problems to be examined, 
the multiple values that apply in each case, and the best answers 
that "practical reason" can provide. 
I find many of Greenawalt's specific answers persuasive, 
and I admire their provisional tone. But I cannot help but won-
der just how we should evaluate them. If "many values count" 
and "no single formula or set of formulas" is available to us, then 
how, exactly, do we deal with the "rich complexity" and "con-
flicting values" that the religion clauses present? By what metric 
do we judge just how "reasonable" any given answer is? 
There is no good answer to this question. We could simply 
throw up our hands and conclude that the religion clauses impli-
cate a range of incommensurable values and historical compro-
mises. Greenawalt does not end at this point, however. He writes 
that "if one is willing to accept an 'approach' or 'discourse' in 
which a court enumerates relevant values and affords some idea 
about how it makes trade-offs, then a viable theory may well be 
available'' (p. 436). 
"Discourse" is the mot juste here. It suggests, in Stanley 
Fish's terms, that there is a recognizable ''practice" of the relig-
ion clauses -like the practice of, say, baseball, in which particu-
lar moves are simply part of the game, and in which our sense of 
good or bad play is as much intuitive as reasoned." religion 
clause practice is just what those of us who are members of the 
religion clauses' interpretive community understand to be a set 
of acceptable moves. 
In that narrow sense, there is no doubt a recognizable "dis-
course" of law and religion, and Greenawalt's volumes make a 
great contribution to it. But does he offer a viable theorv? Can it 
be evaluated-proved or disproved-on anything othe~ than its 
own terms? Is there any way to say that Greenawalt's own con-
6. !d. 
7. See Stanley Fish. Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theon·. 96 YALE L.J. 1773. 
1777-7R (19R7). . . 
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elusions are more or less right, and not just more or less conven-
tional or acceptable? 
Here I am not so sure. To say something satisfying about 
the religion clauses and their animating values, surely we must 
say something explicit about our commitments: which values 
count and for how much, and how to measure and prioritize 
competing values. It is not enough to say that we can simply do 
this from the bottom up, any more than it is possible to reason 
from analogy without understanding the values that animate our 
particular choices of analogy- why foxes are more like wild 
beasts and less like domestic animals, and so on.x Either we are 
going to have to make explicit value judgments and impose them 
from the top down, or we are, to some degree, lost. Greenawalt's 
answers to these questions certainly look reasonable to me in 
many cases. But my sense is that the values underlying law and 
religion are now so contested that we cannot simply accept such 
answers as ''reasonable" -or, at least. we should not be com-
pletely satisfied by them. 
I am thus left with the sense that although Greenawalt's 
treatment of various religion clause issues is indeed reasonable, 
it cannot be genuinely bottom-up. There must be implicit values 
and value judgments at work here, and if left unvoiced they will 
lead us into crippling doubt. Conversely, if this work truly is a 
bottom-up effort, we are left without a strong sense of how to 
evaluate and engage with the individual answers to particular 
problems that comprise the bulk of this project. 
In short, I do not think we can have a philosopher's brief for 
the religion clauses without a more clearly articulated philoso-
phy. We might be able to have a very broad discussion about the 
boundaries of acceptable "practice'' where the religion clauses 
are concerned. But stronger judgments beyond that point will be 
impossible. 
For that reason, I am not sure why Greenawalt gives up on 
giving up, so to speak. Although we can accept that there is a 
conventional practice of the religion clauses, and argue about 
which values will be an acceptable part of that practice, I am not 
so sure that there can be a theory of the religion clauses. And 
without it, I'm not sure what we can say about individual cases 
beyond a very limited point. 
8. See, e.g .. RICHARD A. POSNER. OVERCOMING LAW 518-22 (1995). 
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Again, I frequently agree with Greenawalt's own conclu-
sions. Were our courts staffed with philosopher-judges of 
Greenawalt's stripe, I might be pleased to live under such a re-
gime. But, at the same time that I doubt that a ''Unified Field 
Theory of the Religion Clauses" is possible, I think that its ab-
sence makes it very difficult for us to stand outside the conven-
tional practice and do more than tell just-so stories about the re-
ligion clauses. Even if we were ruled by philosopher-judges who 
took the same care as Greenawalt does, absent a specific theory of 
how to reconcile conflicting religion clause values, the plurality of 
religious and political backgrounds from which these judges come 
would lead to a very thoughtful and polite cacophony. 
II 
My second observation about Greenawalt's books differs 
from the first, although it is related to his "philosopher's brief" 
approach. Greenawalt's philosophical orientation may at times 
give short shrift to deeper questions of social fact, and how to 
accommodate them within the religion clauses. To be sure, 
Greenawalt's treatments of various issues are deeply concerned 
with questions of judicial administration, and he often provides 
useful background on particular religious practices. But this is 
still a philosopher's work, and one sometimes feels that those so-
cial facts are an appetizer for his abstract treatment of the issues, 
rather than the meal itself. 
We might benefit in this area from looking at the religion 
clauses on a more practical institutional level. Rather than rely 
on abstract models, often involving individual religious practi-
tioners or objectors, we might instead think about how religions 
function as institutions. How do those institutions fit within the 
broader social framework: what kinds of practices do they en-
gage in, and what forms of self-regulation constrain them; and 
how do these institutions fit within the broader constitutional 
structure? Such questions might in turn suggest something about 
other institutional players. To what extent, for example, are 
courts competent to evaluate religious institutional practices: 
when are those practices figuratively or literally beyond their ju-
risdiction: and how and when should courts defer to religious in-
stitutions' social practices. or even treat them as legally autono-
mous non-state associations? 
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Recent work has begun to address these questions.9 Of 
course, such an approach requires a theory of its own. But per-
haps one of the motivations for such work has been precisely the 
sense that. if religion clause theories are hard to come by, and if 
one no longer places full faith in the ability of public reason to 
provide sound answers here, then it is worth building a some-
what different model of "bottom-up" reasoning about the relig-
ion clauses. In this model, we start with what we know about re-
ligious institutions and their vital role in the social and 
constitutional constellation, and think about how the law might 
profitably address religious entities as non-state institutions. 
Greenawalt at times flirts with these institutional questions. 
But for the most part he does so for different reasons, relating to 
how courts should administer Free Exercise claims brought by 
individuals. 10 This is not really a thorough-going account of 
churches as institutions. 
For those who are interested in building a genuinely bot-
tom-up understanding of the religion clauses, we might do well 
to focus on the role and function of religious institutions in a plu-
ralistic liberal democracy. On that view, courts might openly 
consider whether particular religious institutions effectively fall 
outside the jurisdiction of the legal regime. Such an approach 
would focus on drawing boundaries between religious institu-
tions and practices and proper "state" concerns, and its bounda-
ries would be institutional and fact-bound rather than relying on 
strictly legal analytical categories. 
I do not know whether such an approach would result in a 
different set of outcomes than the ones that Greenawalt pro-
poses. But the mode of analysis would be quite different. Cer-
tainly, some theory would necessarily underlie this approach. In 
practice, however, such an approach might focus more on par-
ticular institutions and institutional practices, and less on the ab-
stract value-reconciliation and the use of strictly legal tools and 
concepts that figure heavily in the courts' current approach, and 
in Greenawalt's volumes. 
I do not know what Greenawalt would make of such an ap-
proach. But I would like to. 
9. See, e.g .. Paul Horwitz. Churches as Firs£ AmendmenT lnsfiflltions: Of Spheres 
and Sovereignry. 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009): see also Richard W. Garnett. Do 
Churches Mauer? ToVI'ards an Jnsrirutional UndersTanding of rhe Religion Clauses. 53 
VILL. L. REV. 273 (200R). 
10. See, e.g .. GREENAWALT. FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS, supra note 1. at 83. 
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